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Void for Vagueness 
by Carl E. Schneider 
When law regulates a profes-sion, where does it get its 
standards? Largely from the 
profession. Members of professions ac-
quire esoteric and abstract knowledge 
through formal education and the expe-
rience of practice. They use professional 
judgment in applying this knowledge to 
each case. Because legislatures and 
courts lack this expertise, they adopt the 
standards of the experts. Thus in a mal-
practice suit, juries are instructed to de-
termine whether the doctor met medi-
cine's standard of care. Furthermore, 
physicians must be called as expert wit-
nesses to guide juries in that work. 
Even when lawmakers contemplated 
intensifYing their regulation of medi-
cine by creating the duty of informed 
consent, they could consult a literature 
to which doctors and medical ethicists 
contributed crucially. In some jurisdic-
tions, even the scope of the duty is de-
termined by using the medical standard 
of disclosure (although in other jurisdic-
tions the standard is the degree of dis-
closure sufficient to permit the ordinary 
patient to make a sound decision). 
Nor have lawmakers striven to ex-
tend the reach of informed consent be-
yond the norms of medicine. They 
might have done so in two ways. First, 
they might have broadened the legal 
standard of disclosure. This seems to 
have happened only sporadically and 
tentatively. Second, fact-finders (juries 
and trial-court judges) might have inter-
preted the legal standard as demanding 
elaborate or unusual disclosures. This 
too has apparently not much happened. 
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Indeed, plaintiffs rarely bring informed 
consent actions (except as appendages 
to malpractice suits), rarely win them, 
and rarely obtain large verdicts. 
In short, lawmakers have essentially 
established rules intended to hold med-
icine to its own standards and then 
mostly left the system to work unmo-
lested. What lawmakers have not no-
ticed, however, is that the status of in-
formed consent in the medical literature 
has become parlous. Two developments 
particularly matter. First, a torrent of 
empirical evidence now suggests that in-
formed consent does not work as in-
tended: Doctors generally tell patients 
too little and patients generally under-
stand too little for patients to make the 
choices that lawmakers had imagined. 
Second (and relatedly?), the litera-
ture seems to be deserting the term "in-
formed consent." And what instead? A 
comet shower of novel terms. "[T]here 
is now a profusion of competing models 
that attempt to convey subtle differ-
ences in the sharing of information and 
power between clinician and patient." 1 
A smattering of the latest models: "evi-
dence-based patient choice," "informed 
decision-making," "informed medical 
decision-making," "informed treatment 
decision-making," "physician as perfect 
agent," "shared decision-making," 
"shared clinical decision-making," 
"shared medical decision-making," and 
"shared treatment decision-making." 
From this welter of multiplying, mysti-
fYing distinctions, one term has 
emerged most stoutly-"shared deci-
sion-making." 
So, what is shared decision-making? 
Would that I knew. Or that anyone did. 
Makoul and Clayman heroically 
slogged through the literature and con-
cluded that "there is no shared defini-
tion of shared decision making." They 
"identified 31 separate concepts used to 
explicate SDM, only two of which ap-
peared in more than half of the concep-
tual definitions." In fact, "60% of arti-
cles that purport to focus on shared de-
cision-making failed to include any 
conceptual definition at all."2 
As this suggests, many proponents of 
shared decision-making seem to regard 
its meaning as self-evident. And no 
doubt most people suppose that they 
understand the term. "Sharing" does 
the real rhetorical work here. Who 
doesn't understand sharing? Who could 
oppose it? Yet the skimpiest reflection 
reveals that the slogan is ambiguous 
unto incoherence. 
For example, what makes a decision 
"shared"? It is logical, plausible, reason-
able to say, as many advocates of shared 
decision-making seem to say, that any-
one who helps shape a decision, helps 
give the decision meaning, helps give it 
effect, "shares" in it. But on this reading, 
virtually all consequential medical deci-
sions are shared. The doctor must pro-
pose something; the patient must at 
least acquiesce; both have participated; 
they have shared the decision. 
Or look at "sharing" from another 
angle. When doctors and patients talk, 
they develop a framework for their con-
versation and goals for their interaction. 
These often emerge implicitly, with nei-
ther party really grasping what is hap-
pening. Both parties shape the frame-
work and assumptions: Patients initially 
state the issue in the case; doctors ini-
tially state the solution. These frame-
works and assumptions can decisively 
shape the conversation and its conclu-
sions. In this sense, again, almost every 
decision of any moment is "shared." 
In the mess and murk of real life it is 
in fact often hard to say who "made" or 
even "participated in" a decision. A neu-
rologist wants to do a lumbar puncture. 
Patient: "Will the results affect the 
choice of treatment?" Doctor: "No .... 
Let's wait on the LP." What happened? 
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The patient did not explicitly state a 
preference and perhaps had none. Or 
not a clear one. Or a firm one. What if 
the doctor had persisted? What would 
the patient have said? Why did the doc-
tor desist? What decision was actually 
made, and who participated in what 
way? Was this a "shared" decision? I was 
the patient, and I can't answer any of 
these questions. 
In short, "shared decision-making" 
covers so much that it must mean too 
little. But "shared decision-making" is 
obscure in still another weighty way: Its 
relationship to informed consent is baf-
fling. Does the former describe how the 
latter should work, or is it something 
fresh? Is it a response to the latter's per-
ceived failure or its perceived nobility? 
Does shared decision-making enhance 
the patient's authority? Or the doctor's? 
Most writing on the subject just ignores 
these basic questions. And there is au-
thority for many interpretations. 
For example, one defense of shared 
decision-making contends that "con-
cern with patient participation in treat-
ment decision-making has moved well 
beyond informed consent to include 
broader principles of patient autonomy, 
control, and patient challenge to physi-
cian authority."3 On this view, shared 
decision-making continues the in-
formed consent revolution. But how? I 
had always thought informed consent 
embodied broad principles of patient au-
tonomy, control, and challenge to 
physician authority. 
On the other hand, some writing on 
shared decision-making implies that 
doctors should share not only the deci-
sion, but also the authority to make it. 
Charles et al., for example, announce 
that doctors have a "legitimate invest-
ment in the treatment decision" and 
that doctors and patients should build a 
"consensus."4 This is a far-and disqui-
eting-cry from the usual understand-
ing that patients are the principals and 
doctors only their agents. 
Plainly proponents of shared deci-
sion-making need to give their term a 
much better considered and more pre-
cise construction. They need to realize 
that it has no inherent meaning, that it 
describes no natural phenomenon. It is 
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a label applied to a prescription for the 
way doctors and patients should pro-
ceed. Until its proponents agree on the 
prescription, shared decision-making 
can only be a cipher. 
But is agreement possible? Most en-
thusiasts for shared decision-making 
lump all decisions into one homoge-
neous category. However, medical deci-
sions vary along so many axes that gen-
eralizations are doomed. Sometimes de-
cisions rest on reliable evidence, some-
times not. Sometimes choices are few, 
sometimes many. Some decisions are 
weighty, some trivial. Some choices are 
complex, some simple. Some decisions 
are recurring, some unique. Some raise 
technical questions, some moral ques-
tions. Some choices are matters of taste, 
others of calculation. Some decisions 
must be rushed, some can be leisurely. 
Some decisions are made with a long-
known doctor, some with a stranger. 
Some decisions are made with a trusted 
physician, some with a distrusted one. 
This list could be lengthily prolonged. 
The upshot is that decisions are so vari-
ous that no single principle can well 
guide them all. 
Not only do decisions vary, but so do 
doctors and patients, and in ways that 
dispositively affect how they can, and 
want to, and should make decisions. 
Doctors differ in specialty, experience, 
knowledge, insight, sympathy, tact, lo-
quacity, lucidity, persuasiveness, confi-
dence, patience, optimism, resourceful-
ness, trustworthiness, and so on and on. 
Patients differ-here's the short list-in 
intelligence, literacy, numeracy, knowl-
edge, wisdom, confidence, attentive-
ness, dispassion, judgment, insight, 
imagination, experience, anxiety, nerve, 
sanity, aggressiveness, suggestibility, def-
erence, and so on and on. Perhaps most 
crucially, patients differ enormously in 
the way they want their medical deci-
sions made. Worse, they want some 
kinds of decisions made differently 
from other kinds. Worse yet, patients' 
preferences shift with advancing age and 
fluctuating health. 
So suppose courts and legislatures 
concluded that informed consent has 
failed to achieve the purpose for which 
they instituted it. Suppose they con-
eluded that "shared decision-making!" is 
medicine's dernier cri. Could they fol-
low their usual practice of adopting the 
profession's standards as their own? No. 
A legal rule must be both predictable 
and administrable. The subjects of a 
rule must be able to discover what the 
law requires of them; the people who 
administer a rule must be able to com-
prehend it and apply it efficiently. 
Shared decision-making is so enigmatic 
that neither condition can be met. Nor, 
given the proliferating variety of med-
ical decisions, can a definition that 
meets the two conditions be readily 
imagined. 
Informed consent, in contrast, meets 
the two conditions (well, close enough 
for government work). It might be un-
clear in a given case exactly what the 
reasonable patient would want to know 
about a choice, but the principle that 
animates that standard is comprehensi-
ble to doctors, juries, and judges. Yet 
what use is a predictable and adminis-
trable standard that cannot produce its 
intended effects? 
Thus we are brought back to the 
challenge of regulating professions. 
Lawmakers do not understand medi-
cine's work well enough to set standards 
for it. So medicine's standard must be 
adopted. The long-standing principle-
informed consent-is administratively 
practical but a paper tiger. The rising 
principle-shared decision-making-is 
so inchoate that it is not even a paper 
mouse. And so ... ? 
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